

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE AS SANITIZED

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31 March 1954

2003

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF OF PROJECT

SUBJECT: Air Operations Report

1. The LINCOLN Air Support Officer arrived FJHOPEFUL 0300 hours 25 March. The CAT pilots were picked up at [] and brought to FJHOPEFUL. [] and [] were in charge of the security pertaining to this pick up. [] made the Contact and the CAT pilots were loaded into two civilian sedans. The sedans proceeded to FJHOPEFUL via indirect routes to insure no surveillance.

2. Thursday, 25 March: [] and [] supervised setting up air operations, sterilization of aircraft, briefing of sterile air crews, and establishing billets and messing facilities and procedures.

3. Friday, 26 March: Robertson and [] recruited four cargo kickers from the guard force at FJHOPEFUL; loaded aircraft for first black flight; pilots briefed by air operations and security; first black flight departed as scheduled and returned as scheduled.

4. Friday, 26 March: Had meeting with [] on Friday morning. We can depend on 100% cooperation from the Air Force. The Air Force has provided a twenty-four hour guard watch for our aircraft. Quoting [] "Your support is the least of your problems. We consider your project a top-priority project in this command and all you have to do is ask for what you need and I assure you it will be provided. All key personnel in my Command have been so directed."

5. In contrast to support provided by [] the following irregularities at FJHOPEFUL are hereby reported and made of record:

a. Reference: DIR 43772. HONEYWELL made following statement to [] in presence of [] when [] sent cable to DIR in answer to LINC 1264, HONEYWELL informed [] that he had informed [] that he desired to remain FJHOPEFUL and that [] cable indicated that he had not [] told HONEYWELL to send the cable as is. NOTE: HONEYWELL, in presence of [] stated that the reason he changed his mind about staying was that all his furniture and most of his personal effects had already been shipped. ([] statement in reference cable not justified.)

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b. Reference: LINC Operational Immediate 1330. Referenced cable received FJHOPEFUL approximately 2200 hours 25 March. Cable broken down by 0030 26 March. Commo informed C J by phone that he had an operational immediate cable. At approximately 0130 hours 26 March, C J and Robertson were still awaiting cable. C J called commo to determine if cable was completed. Commo had secured and gone home. The night C.Q. was instructed by Commo Officer to pass the following message to C J (he called: Commo had notified C J by phone that he had received an operational immediate cable from LINCOLN pertaining to air operations. C J told commo that he would discuss the cable with LINCOLN personnel the next day at 0730. Commo had no authority to release the cable to LINCOLN personnel. Robertson personally called C J and told him that we believed the referenced cable was important inasmuch as it was sent operational immediate and that the contents of the cable may be of sufficient importance as to require an immediate answer, and that by waiting until office hours the next day might be too late. Robertson requested C J to authorize commo to release the cable to us. The cable was released to us at approximately 0215 hours 26 March and did require an immediate answer. NOTE: In my opinion had no action been taken on this operational immediate cable until the next day, the first scheduled black flight could not have been made. The damage which could have been caused between LINCOLN and C J relationships cannot be estimated. (C J actions concerning referenced operational immediate cable, in my opinion, not justifiable.)

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